When Churches Reorganize by Foohey, Pamela
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law




Indiana University Maurer School of Law, pfoohey@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation






Every year approximately ninety religious organizations1 seek to reorgan-
ize under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.2  In the first part of my work
studying religious organizations’ financial distress,3 I reviewed all of the chap-
ter 11 cases filed by these debtors between 2006 and 2011—approximately
500 cases.4  The vast majority of these cases involved small Christian congre-
gations5 struggling to hold onto their buildings after falling behind on mort-
gage payments.6  In about three-quarters of the cases, the debtors claimed
they held equity cushions in their real property,7 indicating that there may be
value to be preserved through the reorganization process.8  Based on the doc-
*Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Visiting Assistant Professor, Univer-
sity of Illinois College of Law, 2012-2014.  This Article was written in connection with the Empirical
Studies in Bankruptcy panel hosted by the Section on Creditors’ and Debtors’ Rights at the AALS’ 2014
Annual Meeting.  My thanks to Kenworthey Bilz, Dalie´ Jime´ne´z, Robert M. Lawless, Peter Molk, Jennifer
K. Robbennolt, Arden Rowell, Stephen Rushin, Michael Sousa, and Verity Winship for their comments
on this paper and the underlying research, and Nicole Stringfellow for helpful research assistance.  I also
give a special thanks to all of the attorneys and religious organizations’ leaders who took the time to speak
with me.
1I use terms such as “religious organization,” “religious institution,” and “faith-based organization” inter-
changeably and to mean any organization whose operations are motivated in a meaningful way by faith-
based beliefs and principles.
2Pamela Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, 78 MO. L. REV. 719, 732-33 n.83 (2013) (detailing the num-
ber of religious organizations that filed under chapter 11 per year between 2006 and 2011); Ken Walker,
Churches: The New Risky Bet, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Nov. 2013, at 24 (stating that approximately 90
religious congregations filed under chapter 11 in 2012); Pamela Foohey, Are Churches Slowly Recovering?,
CREDIT SLIPS (Jan. 25, 2014, 9:25 a.m.), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/01/are-churches-
slowly-recovering.html (finding that religious organizations filed 107 chapter 11 cases in 2012 and 89
chapter 11 cases in 2013).
3Financial distress occurs when an organization has difficulty paying its financial obligations to its
creditors as they become due. See Charles J. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bank-
ruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH & LEE L. REV. 931, 951 n.91 (2004).
4See generally Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2.
5See id. at 738 tbl.3; infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.  I use the term “congregation” to mean a
group of individuals (the congregants) who meet together regularly for religious worship.
6Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 725-26.
7Id. at 741 n.125.  An equity cushion is the difference between the value of the property and the value
of all liens recorded against it. See David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code,
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 593 n.62 (1989).
8At a minimum, the “value” that may be preserved through reorganization is this equity cushion. See
Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to Critics, 107
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uments submitted in connection with their cases, I ultimately concluded that
chapter 11 has the potential to offer an effective solution to many religious
organizations’ financial problems.9
In analyzing the filing data, I noticed that one leader typically oversaw
the organization.  This leader’s commitment to stabilizing the business as-
pects of the organization and revitalizing the congregation usually was crucial
to the debtor’s survival.10  The presence of this key leader offered an oppor-
tunity to supplement the quantitative filing data with more in-depth qualita-
tive data about the organizations and their cases.  Thus, I conducted
extensive interviews with the leaders of religious organizations that filed
under chapter 11 and the bankruptcy attorneys who represented them.
Relying on these interviews, this Article expands upon my prior consider-
ation of faith-based institutions’ chapter 11 cases and, in doing so, makes
three main contributions.  First, I identify a subset of organizations that
seemed more likely to turn to bankruptcy: small congregationalist and non-
denominational churches, often with predominately African-American mem-
bership.  I also pinpoint salient questions about these churches’ access to
credit and use of bankruptcy for future study.
Second, given that religious organizations continue to file under chapter
11 in not insignificant numbers, I highlight practical considerations for the
attorneys, judges, and parties who will be involved in future cases filed by
faith-based institutions.  Finally, I track the post-bankruptcy outcomes of the
religious organizations represented by the interviewed attorneys.  A sizable
majority of these debtors remained operating either in their original building
or in a new location months after the closing of their bankruptcy cases.  The
chapter 11 process thus appeared to have offered a useful way to deal with
the organizations’ financial distress.  These outcomes provide evidence of the
effectiveness of chapter 11 that are important to ongoing debates about busi-
ness bankruptcy policy.
I. RESEARCHING CHAPTER 11 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION
CASES
My empirical inquiry into financially distressed religious organizations be-
gan with a study of the universe of chapter 11 cases filed nationwide by faith-
MICH. L. REV. 603, 625 (2009) (noting that “[a] reorganization is also thought to produce substantial
positive externalities”).
9Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 767-71.
10Id. at 771-72.  The religious organizations’ cases thereby have hallmarks of two purposes of reorgani-
zation as applied to small businesses: preserving going-concern value by keeping businesses intact or al-
lowing owner-operators to remain with their current business entities. See id. at 771 (summarizing these
two models of reorganization).  For further analysis of what this straddling of the two purposes means for
assessing religious organizations’ cases and for bankruptcy policy, see id. at 772-74.
2014) WHEN CHURCHES REORGANIZE 279
based institutions during the six-year period from January 1, 2006, to Decem-
ber 31, 2011.  I chose this timeframe for two reasons.  First, I wanted to
analyze cases filed after the substantial overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code
brought about by the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (BAPCA), which took effect on October 17, 2005. 11  Second, I chose
the ending date of December 31, 2011, in order to assess the success rate of
the cases studied based on the hypothesis that only a small minority of these
cases would remain pending at the time I analyzed the dataset in December
2012.12
Using filings available via the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER) service, I identified 497 chapter 11 cases filed by 454 unique relig-
ious organizations.13  In creating the dataset, I searched filings from bank-
ruptcy courts located in the fifty United States and the District of
Columbia.14  I removed from the study cases involving debtors that duplicate
services provided in the private market, such as senior living communities,
YMCAs, and hospitals.15  I also eliminated cases filed by the Catholic dio-
ceses and related entities because these cases more closely resemble mass tort
cases, where the focus is on handling widespread litigation.16
To confirm and augment the quantitative data from court filings, I later
interviewed leaders of these religious organizations and their attorneys, focus-
ing on a subset of debtors that also would allow me to explore how social
networks may influence religious organizations’ bankruptcy filings.17  Specifi-
11Pub. L. No. 109-8, 199 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
12See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 745 (noting that 26 cases (5.2%) in the dataset
remained pending as of the end of November 2012).
13For a detailed description of the methodology used to assemble the dataset, see id.at 730-32.
14Id. at 730.
15Id. at 731-32.
16See Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S. CAL. L. REV.
363, 363-65 (2005) (analogizing the diocese cases to mass tort bankruptcy cases).
17Scholars have relied on theories of social networking and context to explain patterns of consumer
bankruptcy filing over time.  Several empirical studies suggest that consumer bankruptcy filing rates in-
crease in a given year if filing rates in the same geographic location rose in the prior year, which sometimes
is referred to as social spillover. See, e.g., Astrid Dick, Andreas Lehnert, & Giorgio Topa, Social Spillovers
in Personal Bankruptcies 1 (New York Federal Reserve, Working Paper, June 2008), available at http://ny
fedeconomists.org/topa/DLT_062808.pdf (studying the extent of social spillover following changes in
state law making it easier to file and finding some evidence of local spillover); David B. Gross & Nicholas S.
Souleles, An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency, 15 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 319,
339-40 (2002) (finding that the “probability that someone files for bankruptcy increases with the number
of people in her state who filed in the recent past”); Scott Fay, Erik Hurst, & Michelle J. White, The
Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 706, 716 (2002) (predicting that if a district exper-
iences an increase in filings in one year, it will experience a greater increase in filings the next year).  These
studies posit that direct information sharing among neighbors and indirect observation of others in a
neighborhood using bankruptcy may explain the increase in filings over time.  See Dick, Lehnert, & Topa,
supra at 1.  I hypothesized that the same social mechanisms may be at work in religious organizations’
filing.
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cally, in analyzing the dataset, I found that the religious organization cases
clustered in certain geographic areas.  As shown in Table 1 below, a slight
majority (51%) of the cases were filed in only ten of the ninety federal
districts.18
Table 1: Ten Districts With Greatest Percentage of Religious
Organization Filings During Study Timeframe
Religious
Organization All Chapter
Cases 11 Cases Congregations
District N % N % N %
N.D. Georgia 53 10.7 1,791 2.9 5,830 1.7
M.D. Florida 38 7.7 2,879 4.7 9,093 2.6
W.D. Tennessee 27 5.4 323 0.5 2,861 0.8
C.D. California 24 4.8 4,791 7.8 10,750 3.1
N.D. Texas 22 4.4 1,868 3.1 8,796 2.6
S.D. Texas 21 4.2 1,684 2.8 7,438 2.2
D. Maryland 18 3.6 1,210 2.0 5,336 1.6
N.D. Illinois 18 3.6 1,504 2.5 6,215 1.8
E.D. North Carolina 17 3.4 1,689 2.8 6,065 1.8
S.D. Florida 16 3.2 697 1.1 3,977 1.2
Total 254 51.1 18,436 30.1 66,361 19.3
The concentration of religious organization filings in these districts is not
simply a reflection of where the majority of all chapter 11 cases are filed.19
Nor do these areas of the country have a higher concentration of religious
organizations than other regions across the United States.20  Given the lack
18Where applicable, I report “Ns,” the number of cases or debtors in the analysis.  In Table 1, N for
Religious Organization Cases Filed is 497, and N for All Chapter 11 Cases is 61,260, and N for Congrega-
tions is 344,894. See supra note 5 for the definition of congregations.
19Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 734-35.  In particular, 48% of all chapter 11 cases
filed during the study’s timeframe came from 10 districts.  Four of these districts are among the districts
from which the majority of religious organizations’ cases originated. Id. at 734 n.90.  The distribution of
filings also is not the same as where chapter 7 or chapter 13 cases are filed across the country. See
Bankruptcy Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatis
tics.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
20Because many have few members and lack permanent locations, it is difficult to determine the precise
number and regional distribution of religious organizations.  The Association of Statisticians of American
Religious Bodies’ 2010 U.S. Religious Census: Religious Congregations & Membership Study provides the
most comprehensive data, including reporting the number of congregations per state county. See Listings
and Rankings (All Years), 2010 U.S. RELIGION CENSUS: RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS & MEMBERSHIP
STUDY, http://www.rcms2010.org/compare.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).  I use this data to compare the
distributions of congregations across the United States and religious organization chapter 11 filings.  Over-
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of an easy explanation for the clumping, I theorized that religious organiza-
tions’ leaders may speak with other pastors, friends, and relatives (that is,
their social networks) in deciding to address their churches’ financial distress
with bankruptcy.  Focusing on religious organizations that filed in these ten
districts offered the benefit of gathering data to answer the question of the
effect of social networks in future work.21
To solicit interviews, I mailed letters to both the attorneys and the lead-
ers of these religious organization debtors, detailing my study and requesting
an interview.22  I asked to interview them about the chapter 11 cases specifi-
cally and the religious organizations generally.  One week later, I followed up
on my letters with a telephone call.23  I conducted telephonic interviews dur-
ing spring 2013 based on scripted, open-ended questions.24  Participants were
not offered any compensation.25
A. ATTORNEYS
Out of the 254 chapter 11 cases filed in these ten districts, the debtors
were represented by 168 different debtor’s attorneys.  From these attorneys,
I randomly selected ninety (54%)to send letters.26  However, I was not able
all, congregations tend to be spread more evenly across the United States, with no more than 3% of total
nationwide congregations located in any one federal district. See id.
21The effect of leaders calling upon their social networks on the geographic concentration of religious
organizations’ chapter 11 filings is one of the subjects of my next article.  For now, I posit this explanation
for the concentration. See also infra Part II.A.
22The mailing addresses came from the debtors’ bankruptcy court filings.  I verified and updated the
addresses via internet searches of the debtors’ operating names and the names of the debtors’ leaders and
attorneys as disclosed on their chapter 11 petitions.
23The phone numbers of the debtors and attorneys generally came from the debtors’ bankruptcy court
filings.  I verified and updated the phone numbers via internet searches.
24As with other studies based on semi-structured interviews, I occasionally asked questions out of
order and asked follow-up questions. See, e.g., Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of
Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 NYU L. REV. 515, 526-27 (2013)
(describing methodology for a study assessing the earned income tax credit program based on interviews of
program recipients); Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67
AM. BANKR. L. J. 501, 512-13 (1993) (interviewing bankruptcy attorneys and trustees “using non-direc-
tive, open-ended questions, not always phrased the same way or asked in the same order”).  One interview
with a leader was conducted in March 2014.  All other interviews took place between April and July of
2013.  Each of the respondents consented to my audio recording of the interview.  I transcribed and coded
all of the interviews myself.  To preserve interviewees’ anonymity, I omit identifying details.  Instead, I
identify each interview subject with a descriptive title such as “Central California Attorney One” or
“Central California Leader One.”  Interview scripts and transcriptions are on file with the author.
25In addition, prior to soliciting interviews, I obtained approval of the interview and data retention
procedures from the University of Illinois’s Institutional Review Board.
26Because of the disparity in the number of attorneys who represented debtors in each district during
the study timeframe, I did not sample equally from the districts.  Rather, I randomly selected an average of
9 attorneys from each district.  This random selection technique ultimately yielded a regionally diverse
pool of interviewees.
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to locate seven of these attorneys.27  Of those remaining, I interviewed
thirty-five attorneys, representing a response rate of 42%.  By district, six of
the attorneys practiced in the Central District of California, six practiced in
the Middle District of Florida, two practiced in the Southern District of
Texas, and three practiced in the each of the other districts.  In the aggregate,
these attorneys handled a total of fifty-eight religious organization cases filed
during the six-year study timeframe and an additional twelve religious organi-
zation cases filed outside the study’s timeframe.
The attorneys concentrated their practices in the area of bankruptcy law,
and mainly represented debtors rather than creditors.  Some predominately
represented individuals with consumer debts, while others primarily repre-
sented small businesses and individuals with business debts.  The diversity of
the attorneys and of their religious organization clients suggests that I inter-
viewed a representative sample of attorneys both from the ten districts in
which they practiced and from the overall population of attorneys who have
represented religious organizations in chapter 11.  Nonetheless, in considering
the results of the interviews, it is important to remain cognizant of the possi-
bility that I reached a non-representative sample of attorneys.
B. LEADERS
The leaders of these religious organizations proved much more difficult to
reach.  Of the 229 separate organizations that filed in the ten districts with
the highest concentrations of cases during the study timeframe, three debtors
were led by the same individual, leaving 226 individual leaders as potential
interview candidates. 28  I successfully contacted ninety-three (41%) of the
leaders.29  Ten agreed to speak with me, for a response rate of 11%.30
Of the ten leaders interviewed, three were affiliated with religious organi-
27These attorneys seemingly either had left law practice or moved to government or in-house posi-
tions.  Regardless, the letters I sent them were returned as undeliverable and I could not find telephone
numbers for them, rendering them unreachable.
28All three of these leaders opened another church with a different incorporation and operating name
after the chapter 11 case of their previous religious organization ended.  Though these three leaders are the
same people (and thus could speak about both churches), the religious organizations themselves are unique
debtor entities.
29I was unable to contact the other 133 leaders because their organizations’ phones were disconnected
and, to the extent that the letters were not returned as undeliverable, they did not respond to the mailed
letter on their own initiative.
30Several factors may contribute to this very low response rate, including difficulties in reaching orga-
nizations that employ leaders on a part-time basis, a specific reluctance of leaders to discuss bankruptcy
given that most religious writings condemn bankruptcy, and a more general reluctance of leaders to discuss
their organizations’ financial situations with an outsider. See Todd J. Zwyicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social
Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 393, 398-99, n.25 (2001) (noting that repaying debt is a tenant of
most religions), Robert Cornwall, Part-Time Pastor, Full-Time Church, by Robert LaRochelle, THE CHRIS-
TIAN CENTURY (March 28, 2011), http://www.christiancentury.org/reviews/2011-03/part-time-pastor-
full-time-church-robert-larochelle (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (noting that a majority of congregations in the
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zations located in the Central District of California, three were from organi-
zations located in the Middle District of Florida, and another two leaders
were from organizations in the Western District of Tennessee.  The remain-
ing two leaders were affiliated with organizations in the Northern District of
Georgia and the Northern District of Illinois.
Reflecting the general breakdown of religious organization debtors’ affilia-
tions overall, all ten leaders came from Christian congregations, most of
which were non-denominational or congregationalist.31  The membership of
nine of the ten congregations was predominately African American.32  As
detailed in the next section, the attorneys I interviewed noted that a dispro-
portionate percentage of religious organizations that contacted them regard-
ing bankruptcy were Black non-denominational or congregationalist Christian
churches.33  Thus, the background of the ten leaders I interviewed seems
consistent with the general makeup of religious institutions that file under
chapter 11.  Given this, I have relied on these interviews to augment the
attorneys’ observations about representing religious organizations, though in
light of the response rate, I remain cognizant that the leaders interviewed
may not be representative of religious organization debtors and leaders
generally.
II. THE CHURCHES BEHIND THE FILINGS
The driving force behind the chapter 11 filings of the religious organiza-
tions studied was to protect the organization’s real property from foreclosure,
thereby saving money that congregants had invested in buildings and the
congregations themselves.34  The underlying financial problems that caused
the organizations to become delinquent on their mortgages generally related
to the effects of the Great Recession or management missteps.35  In addition
to confirming these two main causes of financial distress, my interviews with
United States have fewer than 100 members and cannot afford to employ full-time pastors or similar
leaders).
31See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 737 tbl.2.
32One leader did not discuss the racial makeup of the congregation, though an internet search reveals
that the congregation is predominately African American based on recent pictures of church services.
Assuming this congregation is predominately African American, all of the interviewed leaders came from
Black Churches. “Black Church” refers to predominately African American congregations and includes
historically African American congregations and churches with predominately African America member-
ship from denominations generally associated with predominately white membership. See C. ERIC LIN-
COLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1
(1990).
33See infra Part II.A.
34More than 75% of debtors identified concerns about real property as motivating their filings.
Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 756; see also id. at 767-70 (discussing how reorganization
preserved economic value and established communities).
35Id. at 758-67.
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religious organizations’ leaders and their bankruptcy attorneys highlighted
three related characteristics of these organizations that may have contributed
to their susceptibility to financial distress of a magnitude that led them to file
under chapter 11.
A. LACK OF AFFILIATION WITH PARTICULAR LARGER
DENOMINATIONS
A specific religious organization’s tendency to consider filing for bank-
ruptcy may relate to its denomination or lack of affiliation.  Nondenomina-
tional churches and certain Christian denominations were overrepresented
among the approximately 500 religious organizations that filed during the
study timeframe.  A large majority of the debtors with affiliations were asso-
ciated with congregationalist denominations,36 such as Pentecostal churches
and those of several Baptist sects.37  Similar to nondenominational churches,
congregationalist churches typically are not subject to an overarching denom-
inational governing structure, particularly one to which they can turn for
financial assistance.38  For nondenominational and congregationalist churches
left to address their financial problems alone, bankruptcy may have repre-
sented their last remaining option.
The bankruptcy attorneys I interviewed thought that their religious or-
ganization clients’ effective lack of affiliation was a significant factor in lead-
ing these clients to turn to chapter 11.  Table 2 summarizes the affiliations of
the interviewed attorneys’ clients that filed during the study timeframe.39
36Id. at 737.
37The Pentecostal movement emphasizes lay control through the authority of the founding pastor. See
Joel Robbins, The Globalization of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity, 33 ANN. REV. OF ANTHRO-
POLOGY 117, 134 (2004).  Though an individual Baptist church may belong to a convention, Baptist sects
are “loosely knit,” effectively rendering each church autonomous.  LINCON & MAMIYA, supra note 32, at
43-44.
38Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 737.
39Interviewed attorneys represented a total of 58 of the 254 debtors that filed in the ten districts with
the greatest percentages of religious organization filings during the study timeframe. See supra Part I.A.
Table 2 combines certain Christian denominations to protect the identity of the interviewed attorneys
because only one or two churches affiliated with various denominations filed during the study timeframe.
The “other religions” category includes all non-Christian debtors, again combined to protect attorneys’
identities.
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Table 2: Religious Affiliation of Attorneys’ Clients That
Filed During Study Timeframe
N %
Nondenominational Christian 26 44.8
Baptist 16 27.6
Church of God in Christ 5 8.6
Christian - Other Denominations 4 6.9
Other Religions 3 5.2
Apostolic 2 3.4
Christian - School 2 3.4
Total 58 100.0
Adding together nondenominational Christian churches, churches from vari-
ous Baptist branches, and Apostolic and Church of God in Christ churches,
both of which are part of the Pentecostal movement,40 85% of the attorneys’
clients were not part of a larger overarching organization that typically is
equipped (or expected) to provide financial support as needed.  Likewise,
some of the attorneys who represented other subsets of religious institution
debtors, such as Jewish Chabads, described a comparable governance struc-
ture in which the debtor, though part of a specific movement, could not look
to other affiliated organizations for financial assistance.41
Attorneys viewed the lack of or lax affiliation as significant not only from
the standpoint of financial assistance, but also because the autonomy given to
nondenominational and congregational churches often resulted in ineffective
internal governance.  As one attorney noted, “churches that are more closely
tied to a larger denominational structure are more likely to be subjected to
greater oversight.”42  A Lutheran church debtor “seemed to be much more of
a corporate operation with a functioning board.”43  Similarly, one attorney
viewed the decision making in Presbyterian churches as different from the
“loosely functioning” boards of more autonomous churches.44  Indeed, the
greatest risk of succumbing to financial distress appeared to exist in nonde-
40See 3 DAVID E. BERNARD, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY A.D.
1900-2000, at 358-59 (1999) (listing Apostolic and Church of God in Christ as Pentecostal churches).
41See Interview with S. Fla. Attorney Three (April 26, 2013) (stating that “Chabads work differ-
ent[ly] than normal synagogues” and noting that a chabad “basically need[s] a couple [of] big donors to
support [it]”); Interview with S. Fla. Attorney One, at 2-4 (April 25, 2013) (discussing chabads).  The
Chabad-Lubavitch movement is worldwide, but each house is organized around one rabbi. See About
Chabad-Lubavitch, http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/36226/jewish/About-Chabad-Luba
vitch.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
42Interview with N. Ill. Attorney One, at 2 (April 24, 2013).
43Interview with C. Cal. Attorney One, at 4 (April 26, 2013).
44Interview with S. Tex. Attorney Two, at 3-4 (June 17, 2013).
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nominational and congregationalist churches that also vested all authority in
one leader, usually the pastor (and sometimes his or her family).  These
churches, attorneys observed, were “most likely to run into trouble.”45
Moreover, approximately one third of the attorneys who represented
Christian churches mentioned another demographic skew to their religious
organization clients.  The churches they represented were mainly Black
Churches.46  Some of these attorneys had only represented Black Churches,47
and some of the attorneys hypothesized that these churches approached them
for representation because they were African American themselves.48
This racial demographic skew bears additional study.  Though Black
Churches disproportionately may be comprised of small congregationalist and
nondenominational churches, they still may be filing under chapter 11 more
often than they appear in these subsets of religious organizations.  Further
investigating why Black Churches turn to bankruptcy may expose variations
in the lending market, both in terms of the secured lenders’ willingness to
fund Black Churches’ building purchases and their willingness to negotiate
modifications of the loans when the churches experience difficulty remaining
current on their obligations.49  Thus, banks and other lenders may influence
the demographic skew of religious organization debtors.  Further study also
may reveal that Black Churches learn about chapter 11 from their social net-
works such that they are more likely to use the bankruptcy system, likewise
influencing the demographic skew of religious organization debtors.50
Finally, specific to these African American congregations, attorneys high-
lighted a consistent dynamic that further impacted the churches’ ability to
withstand financial distress.  The organizations’ boards yielded control of the
45Interview with N. Ill. Attorney One, supra note 42, at 2; see also Interview with W. Tenn. Attor-
ney Three, at 2 (May 15, 2013) (“In each of these cases, the church was dominated by one family of the
minister.”); Interview with N. Ga. Attorney One, at 3 (May 10, 2013) (“[T]his [church] was family
owned and family run.”); Interview with E. N.C. Attorney One, at 2 (May 3, 2013) (“This was basically a
one guy show.”).
46Of the thirty-two attorneys who represented Christian debtors, ten  (32%) mentioned
demographics. See supra note 32 for the definition of “Black Church.”
47See, e.g., Interview with S. Tex. Attorney Two, supra note 44, at 2 (“Without exception, [my and
my partners’ clients] are all black churches.  All of them.  And they’re all congregationalist churches.”);
Interview with E. N.C. Attorney Three, at 2 (May 15, 2013) (“All of these [churches] . . . have black
congregations.”); Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Three, at 5 (April 22, 2013) (“I deal with black
churches.”).
48See, e.g., Interview with N. Ga. Attorney Three, at 1 (June 20, 2013) (“[There are not a lot of
African American corporate bankruptcy lawyers in the nation.”); Interview with Md. Attorney One, at 1
(May 6, 2013)  (“[T]here’s not a lot of African American attorneys doing chapter 11.”); Interview with S.
Tex. Attorney One, at 1 (May 2, 2013) (“There are very few lawyers, African American lawyers in [my]
area.”).
49See infra Part III.B for further discussion of lenders’ pre-bankruptcy actions.
50See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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church to one person, who became the “driving force”51 behind the congrega-
tion and who “called the shots.”52  One attorney commented, “the minister is
a king, and his wife is the queen . . . without exception in every single black
church I’ve dealt with.”53  Attorneys thought that the lack of accountability
this vesting of power sanctioned invited mismanagement that could put un-
due strain on church finances.54
B. SIZE OF THE CONGREGATION
A religious organization’s size also may influence its propensity to seek
bankruptcy protection.  The religious institutions that filed during the study
timeframe were overwhelmingly small based on their assets and debts.  They
owned a building worth a median of $1.2 million and personal property val-
ued at a median of approximately $50,000.55  Three-quarters of the debtors
qualified as small businesses as defined by the Code.56  The amount of the
organizations’ assets and debts likely reflected a smaller membership and reve-
nue base.  Consequently, small churches may be more vulnerable to economic
fluctuations, poor business decisions, and membership attrition.
The term “small church” encompasses two subcategories: “family run”
congregations of fifty or fewer members and “pastoral” congregations of fifty
to 150 members.57  Both subcategories of churches tend to be nondenomina-
tional or congregationalist.  A family church’s leadership is “organized around
one or two matriarchs or patriarchs who are often the heads of extended
biological families in the church,”58 which attorneys noted in describing some
of their clients as “family owned and family run.”59  The patriarch or matri-
51Interview with Md. Attorney One, supra note 48, at 2.
52Interview with E. N.C. Attorney Three, supra note 47, at 3; see also LYLE E. SCHALLER, THE SMALL
CHURCH IS DIFFERENT 29 (1982) (“Regardless of how long they have been in existence, black congrega-
tions frequently are strongly pastor-centered.”).
53Interview with S. Tex. Attorney Two, supra note 44, at 2.
54Interview with E. N.C. Attorney Three, supra note 47, at 3 (“[T]here wasn’t enough supervision
over finances.”); Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Four, at 3 (May 14, 2013) (“Some of these pastors are
living large . . . .”); Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney Two, at 4 (May 1, 2013) (“Their biggest problem
was just gross, gross mismanagement [related to the lead minister’s actions].”).
55Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 738 tbl.3.
56Id. at 739 n.106.  The Code provides that a small business debtor is a debtor with aggregate debts as
of the petition date not exceeding $2,343,300 (as of April 2010).  11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) (2012).
57“Small churches” generally are defined by the number of congregants, but also may be defined by the
number of pastors and number of buildings owned. See John M. Koessler, The Dynamics of Small Church
Ministry, 3 THE MASTER’S SEMINARY J. 175, 176 n.2 (1992) (discussing varying definitions of a “small
church”); ALICE MANN, THE IN-BETWEEN CHURCH: NAVIGATING SIZE TRANSITIONS IN CONGREGA-
TIONS 77 (1998) (categorizing churches that have less than 100 members as family-sized and pastoral-
sized).
58MANN, supra note 57, at 77; see also STEVEN E. BURT AND HAZEL A. ROPER, RAISING SMALL
CHURCH ESTEEM 23 (1992) (“Not only does the Family Church feel like family to its participants, in some
instances, the church literally is family.”).
59Interview with N. Ga. Attorney One, supra note 45, at 3; see supra note 45.
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arch typically controls the key operations of the church,60 though indepen-
dent congregations or congregations with loose affiliations tend to be “very
pastor-centered, with the laity in a supportive role to that strong and mag-
netic ministerial personality.”61  Likewise, in a pastoral church, the pastor is
the central figure.62  This type of church is the “one guy show” attorneys
sometimes represented.63
Scholars of congregational systems have noted that a small church’s size
limits its finances, which in turn may hinder its sustainability and growth,64
and which makes the cost of the building the church’s largest expense.65  At-
torneys likewise linked the size of the religious organization to serious finan-
cial instability.66  They thought that small churches were impacted more
severely by economic downturns,67 and were more likely to have difficulty
finding and negotiating competitively priced loans.68
My interviews with leaders support the apparent denominational, demo-
graphic, and size skew of the religious organization debtors.  A majority of
the leaders interviewed were affiliated with congregationalist or nondenomi-
national churches, and nine of the ten leaders were from predominately Afri-
60See MANN, supra note 57, at 77 (noting that “the pastor functions in a chaplain role, leading worship
and giving pastoral care”); Roy M. Oswald, How to Minister Effectively in Family, Pastoral, Program, and
Corporate-Sized Churches, 17 ACTION INFORMATION 5, 5 (1991) (“It is the patriarchs and matriarchs
who control the church’s leadership needs.”), available at http://enrichmentjournal.ag.org/200702/200702
_000_various_size.cfm.
61SCHALLER, supra note 52, at 29.
62MANN, supra note 57, at 77 (“The pastor is the central figure, holding together a small circle of
leaders.”).
63Interview with E. N.C. Attorney One, supra note 45, at 2.  Small churches historically have been
nondenominational or congregationalist; see W. CURRY MAVIS, ADVANCING THE SMALLER LOCAL
CHURCH 11 (1957) (identifying one of small churches’ limitations as “a lack of denominational or commu-
nity status”).
64See LYLE SCHALLER, THE SMALL MEMBERSHIP CHURCH 100 (1994) (“Money, rather than ministry
and mission, becomes the most influential factor in policy making.”); JACKSON W. CARROLL, SMALL
CHURCHES ARE BEAUTIFUL 125 (1977) (“Churches with membership of less than two hundred persons
are likely to have resources insufficient or barely adequate to maintain the institution and carry on a
program.”).
65See ANTHONY G. PAPPAS, ENTERING THE WORLD OF THE SMALL CHURCH 9 (2000) (describing
the cost of the church building as “a threat”); LYLE SCHALLER, 44 WAYS TO INCREASE CHURCH ATTEND-
ANCE (1987) (listing real estate considerations as one of six main areas that church leaders need to con-
sider); Dean B. McIntyre, The Small Church Primer: Strengths, Weaknesses, Worship, and Music in the
Small-Membership Church, GBOD, http://www.gbod.org/lead-your-church/general-resources/resource/
the-small-church-primer-strengths-weaknesses-worship-and-music-in-the-small (last visited Feb. 5, 2014)
(describing how the purchase of an old building can lead a small church into serious financial problems).
66Ten attorneys described their clients as either very small, small, or as having a membership of fewer
than 200 congregants.
67See Interview with E. N.C. Attorney Three, supra note 47, at 3; Interview with N. Tex. Attorney
Two, at 4 (May 2, 2013).
68Interview with N. Tex. Attorney Three, at 3 (May 13, 2013) (“[A] small church or small fledgling
church or medium size church can’t get commercial business lending because they don’t have the proven
track record, the cash flow . . . .”).
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can-American congregations.69  With the exception of one, they each
pastored a “small church,” with an active membership between 100 and 200
members at the time of the bankruptcy filing.70
These leaders admitted that their congregations encountered difficulty
paying the mortgage in the wake of the Great Recession and struggled with
general mismanagement.71  Leaders further spoke of internal dynamics that
they thought stalled the churches’ responses to their financial declines.72
They also identified trouble in obtaining loans as smaller organizations, 73 as
well as their churches’ independence from overarching institutions as salient
factors in difficulties they faced as leaders in resolving their churches’ finan-
cial problems.74  In the case of one church affiliated with a more organized
denomination, which theoretically could have intervened with financial assis-
tance, the leader detailed how the church was required to pay dues to its
parent organization every year, regardless of the church’s financial situation
that year.75  Overall, denomination and size (and possibly racial
demographics), particularly when combined, may render certain subsets of
69See supra Part I.B.
70Two of the churches previously had memberships of between 400 and 500, but membership had
declined significantly by the time the churches filed.  One church had “faithful” membership of about 60,
though approximately 200 people were on the membership roster.  Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two,
at 3 (Mar. 17, 2014).  Some leaders likewise described their churches as small. See, e.g., Interview with M.
Fla. Leader Three, at 1 (May 14, 2013) (“We’re just a small congregation. . . . The oldest person in my
church is the mother of my church . . . .”); Interview with C. Cal. Leader Two, at 1 (May 10, 2013) (“[I]t’s
a small congregation.”); Interview with M. Fla. Leader Two, at 1 (May 3, 2013) (noting operational
problems that accompanied the “small church”).
71See, e.g., Interview with C. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 70, at 1 (“[I]f the economic climate of a
country is such that people are losing their jobs, and so forth, the church can’t function.”); Interview with
M. Fla. Leader Two, supra note 70, at 1 (discussing how a previous pastor had mismanaged the church);
Interview with C. Cal. Leader One, at 2 (Apr. 17. 2013) (detailing how previous management had created
many of the church’s problems).
72See Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 70, at 2 (“[W]hen you go through a crisis,
information tends to travel, that is negative information. People tend to shun or reject. But then when
they pretty much find out what’s going on . . . [they] find themselves coming back.”); Interview with M.
Fla. Leader One, at 2 (Apr. 18, 2013) (commenting that the trustee board was slow to act “when it came
time to turn things around”); Interview with W. Tenn. Leader One, at 2 (May 1, 2013) (describing how a
church split was one of the main factors leading to the church filing for bankruptcy).
73See Interview with M. Fla. Leader Three, supra note 70, at 3 (hypothesizing that banks thought of
churches as risky small businesses); Interview with N. Ill. Leader One, at 3 (May 6, 2013) (describing the
church’s mortgage lender as “totally heartless”); Interview with N. Ga. Leader One, at 2 (Apr. 17, 2013)
(detailing how the church had a balloon note with “an interest rate that was floating and the bank at the
time was not interested in giving us a lower rate”); see also Interview with S. Tex. Attorney One, supra
note 48, at 3 (commenting that religious organizations encounter similar problems as consumers, such as
the escalating interest rates of variable loans).  Religious organization debtors’ chapter 11 filings likewise
identified the effects of the Great Recession on their ability to find capital as one of the reasons they fell
behind on mortgage payments. See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 758-62.
74See Interview with C. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 70, at 1 (contrasting the Catholic Church’s
“infrastructure” with less hierarchical Pentecostal assemblies).
75Interview with C. Cal. Leader One, supra note 71, at 2-3.
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religious organizations more susceptible to fluctuations in revenue and ex-
penses that affect their ability to pay their debts, thereby causing them ulti-
mately to turn to bankruptcy.76
C. MANAGEMENT MISSTEPS
Though the Great Recession took its toll on religious organizations, as it
did on small businesses generally,77 the nature of religious organizations
seemed to create additional and unique avenues for management failure.  Like
managers of for-profit businesses, leaders sometimes mismanaged the business
aspects of the church, entering into unprofitable side ventures and misjudging
cash flow versus expenses.78  However, the leaders of many of the smaller
congregations lacked business acumen, even more so than owners of small
businesses.  Consequently, these organizations’ books and records often were
in disarray, and their leaders generally were less sensitive to the business
aspects of the churches, including not foreseeing and planning for the impact
of the recession on the congregation’s giving.79
Even more unique to religious organizations, beloved pastors sometimes
mishandled the churches’ spiritual matters and made missteps in their per-
sonal lives that alienated their congregants.80  When members lost faith in
their churches’ leaders, they reduced their contributions.81  Alternately,
members simply left the congregation, likewise resulting in a reduction in
cash flow.82  Considered together with the challenges of guiding a small con-
gregation through financial problems, the unique issues of managing religious
organizations may have made certain organizations even more susceptible to
finding themselves in financial distress that eventually required them to turn
to the bankruptcy system.
76Denomination and size merely may correlate with religious organizations’ chapter 11 filings.  A more
detailed study is necessary to assess whether size, denomination, and racial demographics are predictive of
higher bankruptcy filing rates.
77See Robert W. Fairlie, Entrepreneurship, Economic Conditions, and the Great Recession, 22 J. OF
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 207, 207 (2013) (“Business bankruptcy filings and closures increased sharply
in the recent recession.”).
78Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 762-67.
79See, e.g., Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Six, at 4 (May 10, 2013) (“[T]heir books are in even
worse shape than most businesses.”); Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Three, at 6 (May 9, 2013) (“[M]any
of these churches . . . are not particularly sophisticated with respect to finances”); Interview with M. Fla.
Attorney Three, at 5 (May 8, 2013) (noting how a client’s leaders’ “lack of business acumen” proved
frustrating); Interview with C. Cal. Attorney One, supra note 43, at 3 (describing how the church’s
leaders “overextended themselves in terms of their operating expenses . . .”).
80Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 762-67.
81Id.
82Id.; see also Interview with S. Tex. Attorney One, supra note 48, at 3 (“The neighborhood was in
transition, and they lost membership. And then they had a number of members who were laid off.”);
Interview with M. Fla. Attorney One, at 3 (May 2, 2013) (noting that in the cases handled, the church
either suffered a loss of membership or its members were dealing with their own financial troubles).
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III. CHALLENGES IN REPRESENTING RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS IN CHAPTER 11
The characteristics of many of the religious organizations that sought to
reorganize likewise influenced the chapter 11 process, and presented bank-
ruptcy attorneys with several stumbling blocks during their representations
of religious organization debtors.  In discussing these difficulties, attorneys
highlighted practical considerations they thought other attorneys, judges, and
parties involved in future cases may benefit from bearing in mind.
A. UNCLEAR GOVERNING STRUCTURE: WHO IS THE CLIENT?
Attorneys identified religious organizations’ governing structure as the
leading “special consideration” to take into account in representing a religious
organization in chapter 11.83  All of the attorneys’ clients were overseen by a
board, usually called the trustee board.84  To file a chapter 11 petition, the
organizations’ articles of incorporation typically required this board to give
written authorization.85  However, some churches’ bylaws gave authority to
the “body” or laity, possibly requiring consensus among all members.86  As an
initial matter, this prompted questions about who had the ability to authorize
a filing.87
The main challenge, however, related to the board frequently granting
significant control over the operations of the church to one pastor, who often
also effectively controlled the board.88  In these instances, attorneys’ primary
contact was usually this pastor.89  The resulting mismatch between who at-
83One open-ended question I asked attorneys was: “Are there any special considerations that must be
thought through when representing religious organizations?”
84State law provides that nonprofit corporations must be governed by boards. See ELIZABETH
SCHMIDT, NONPROFIT LAW: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION 47 (2011).
85See, e.g., Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney Three, supra note 45, at 2 (“In order to satisfy the
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, I had to make sure that the board functioned appropriately.”);
Interview with Md. Attorney One, supra note 48, at 2 (“[O]nce [the church] get to the point of making a
corporate resolution, you’re basically dealing primarily with that lead person who signed the resolution.”).
86See Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney One, at 2 (May 2, 2013) (noting that where a church
belonged to the “body” under its bylaws, the church had authorized the pastor to make all the decisions).
87See Interview with N. Tex. Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 3 (noting that in one case, the secured
creditor filed a motion questioning whether the church had secured proper authorization to file).
88See, e.g., Interview with N. Ga. Attorney Two, at 2 (May 21, 2013) (“[A]ll of them have had
[boards], some to a lesser extent than others.”); Interview with Md. Attorney One, supra note 48, at 2
(comparing churches to “small business, sole proprietors . . . because there’s usually one person that’s the
driving force behind [the church]”); Interview with N. Ga. Attorney One, supra note 45, at 3 (describing
how the lead pastor controlled the board, which was comprised of family members); see also supra Part
II.A.
89In two other less common scenarios, the lead pastor or reverend was not the attorneys’ primary
contact.  In the first scenario, the pastor had moved to a different congregation or the congregation essen-
tially had ousted the pastor.  The senior deacon or trustee board then was left in charge. See Interview
with Md. Attorney Two, at 2 (May 7, 2013) (noting that two senior deacons were the attorney’s primary
contacts after the lead pastor had left the congregation).  Second, the religious organization employed a
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torneys interacted with and reported to, and who had the ability, at least on
paper, to make decisions for the organization resulted in questions about who
truly “was speaking with authority.”90  Even if a church’s board members and
congregants were deferential to their pastor, attorneys still struggled to make
sure that everyone who needed to be involved was in “alignment” with the
decisions that were being made.91
In this way, attorneys described religious organization chapter 11 cases as
requiring “consensus building” 92 and “acting almost as a referee,”93 much
more so than in small business cases.  It took time to determine the pecking
order of authority,94 to get a “feel for what is going on” besides the pastor’s
story,95 and more generally to be sensitive to the different cultures that exist
within religious organizations.96  The “slippery” nature97 of these organiza-
tions left attorneys feeling that they had more than one client,98 and that an
entire community was at stake.99  Because of the community aspect of the
representation, attorneys enjoyed being part of these cases, even if they had
to expend time and energy navigating the governing structure and culture.100
But they nonetheless focused on how crucial it is to be “smart” about inter-
acting with the leader who comes to them, with the board members who may
have the final say, and with the members whose input (monetary and other-
wise) may be vital to saving the congregation.101
stricter governing structure whereby the head of the trustee board or the president of the congregation
was the attorney’s main contact. See Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Six, at 4 (May 28, 2013) (describing
interacting with the president of the congregation of a church affiliated with a more organized
denomination).
90Interview with E. N.C. Attorney One, supra note 45, at 2.
91Interview with E. N.C. Attorney Two, at 5 (May 13, 2013). See also Interview with N. Ill. Attor-
ney Three, supra note 79, at 1 (describing how it was “difficult” to get in contact with all the people who
ran the church); Interview with Md. Attorney Two, supra note 89, at 2 (noting that it took extra time to
make sure that the governing body was “on the same page” as to what the church should do).
92Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Two, at 2 (Apr. 18, 2013).
93Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney One, supra note 86, at 4.
94Interview with S. Tex. Attorney Two, supra note 44, at 3; see also Interview with N. Ill. Attorney
One, supra note 42, at 6 (noting that answers to questions about who owns the church entity “are simpler
for small businesses, and they can be very convoluted for churches. Who is the client, who has the author-
ity, that sort of thing”).
95Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Three, supra note 47, at 2.
96Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Two, supra note 92, at 2.
97Interview with S. Fla. Attorney Two, at 5 (Apr. 23, 2013).
98See Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney Two, supra note 54, at 6 (“[W]ith the church, you’re
dealing with at least two people, possibly ten people.”); Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Six, supra note
79, at 4 (“There’s more collective input.”).
99See Interview with N. Ga. Attorney Two, supra note 88, at 1 (“You have to take into consideration
the congregation, the other leaders in the church, the implication for the church and the community.”).
100See infra Part III.E.
101See, e.g., Interview with Md. Attorney Three, at 5 (May 24, 2013) (noting that “my approach is
going to be different the next time” in representing a church); Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Six, supra
note 79, at 5 (noting that in future representations “I’ll know what to look for”); Interview with S. Fla.
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B. THE CHURCH BUILDING AS AN ALBATROSS
Regardless of the underlying causes of religious organizations’ financial
distress, the primary goal of the vast majority of congregations studied was to
save their building from foreclosure.102  Attorneys representing religious or-
ganization debtors offered two insights into the unique issues surrounding
saving the building that may have significantly influenced some of their cli-
ents’ paths to bankruptcy, the reorganization processes, and case outcomes.
First, attorneys emphasized the strong emotional attachment that congre-
gations have to their buildings.  Congregants seemed to view their church
building as “somewhere they can go and be proud and worship and invite
other churches to visit and raise their families in.  They are looking for a
home.”103  Filing for bankruptcy was not merely about saving equity in a
building, but about “keep[ing] the congregation and keep[ing] the church
together.”104  The loss of a particular building may have equaled the loss of
the congregation.105  In short, “they fall in love with that one church.”106
Because leaders and congregants often were “not driven by normal busi-
ness considerations,”107 they may have behaved irrationally when faced with
a foreclosing lender.  Bankruptcy provided a venue for them to realize that
they needed to downsize, to “get over” 108 losing their “spiritual homes.”109
At the same time, the automatic stay110 and the chapter 11 process gave
leaders an opportunity to try to sell the buildings at higher than fire sale
prices, potentially preserving some of the organizations’ equity, which they
could use to rebuild their congregations.111
Attorney Two, supra note 97, at 5 (stating that “I’d be a lot smarter about” representing churches in the
future).
102See, e.g., Interview with Md. Attorney One, supra note 48, at 2 (“[A]t least in this area, it’s all been
about the real estate.”); Interview with M. Fla. Attorney One, supra note 82, at 4 (noting that both cases
handled were about the mortgage); Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Three, supra note 47, at 5
(“[C]hurches . . . got a little too ambitious and took on more debt than they could service.”).
103Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Three, supra note 47, at 6.
104Interview with E. N.C. Attorney One, supra note 45, at 4.
105See Interview with E. N.C. Attorney Two, supra note 91, at 6 (“[I]t would have been really
disruptive to the church had they lost their buildings.”); Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney Two, supra
note 54, at 7 (“[I]f you don’t have a building, I don’t think you stay together very long.”).
106Interview with N. Tex. Attorney Three, supra note 68, at 4.
107Interview with S. Fla. Attorney Two, supra note 97, at 4.
108Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Three, supra note 47, at 6.
109See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 767-68 (discussing how congregants “seem to
become intertwined with the institutions’ buildings”).
110See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (imposing a stay on various actions by creditors to collect on their
claims against the debtor).
111See, e.g., Interview with Md. Attorney Two, supra note 89, at 2  (describing how a client sold its
building during its case); Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Two, at 2 (May 7, 2013) (describing how a
client planned to sell property); Interview with N. Ill. Attorney One, supra note 42, at 4 (“[T]he auto-
matic stay give[s churches] some breathing space to . . . make transitions”).
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Second, attorneys theorized that although mortgage lenders had
threatened or initiated foreclosure proceedings, on balance, lenders did not
want to foreclose on a church.112  Banks may have worried that a church
building would prove difficult to sell given that it is “built to be a church”113
and that the bank would not be able to “do anything with a church building
except have a church in it.”114  Foreclosing on a religious organization also
could invite bad publicity. For example, one attorney questioned, “in the end,
who’s going to foreclose on a church in a small town?”115
When pressed as to why banks would initiate proceedings they were not
eager to conclude, one attorney hypothesized that federal legislation may re-
quire them to “pursue all of their rights and remedies,” including foreclo-
sure.116  Alternatively, mortgage lenders may threaten foreclosure in order to
convince religious organizations’ leaders that they need to make concessions.
In some instances, leaders seemed to become so entrenched in their refusal to
compromise on any item having to do with their members’ “spiritual homes”
that they became “convinced that the bank was the devil.”117  Conversely,
lenders’ unwillingness to make deals with religious organizations, for
whatever reason, may have impeded the productivity of negotiations, eventu-
ally requiring foreclosure.118
Moreover, though banks might have initiated foreclosure proceedings,
some of the church leaders interviewed indicated that they learned of the
possibility of filing bankruptcy from their lenders.119  One explanation for
why lenders would start a foreclosure but suggest a bankruptcy filing to their
borrowers is that a chapter 11 proceeding offered the lender a way to gain
access to the debtor’s financial records, allowing it to better assess the relig-
ious organization’s continued viability.120  As an added bonus, the chapter 11
process would force the churches to conform to budgeting requirements and
112But see Interview with M. Fla. Attorney One, supra note 82, at 4 (hypothesizing that banks may
wait to initiate foreclosure proceedings, but once started, would follow through).
113Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney Three, supra note 45, at 2.
114Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney Two, supra note 54, at 3; see also id. (“[S]ometimes, some of the
banks, if you just say, well, here are the keys, they’ll back off and work with you.”).
115Interview with N. Tex. Attorney Two, supra note 67, at 5; see also Interview with N. Ill. Attorney
Four, supra note 54, at 4 (“[M]any banks are reluctant to foreclose on some of these churches for various
reasons . . . goodwill and their reputation in the community and so forth.”).
116Interview with N. Ga. Attorney Three, supra note 48, at 4; see also W. Tenn. Attorney Two, supra
note 54, at 9 (“These big banks, federal regulations don’t permit them to work with people.”).
117Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney Two, supra note 54, at 7.
118One explanation relates to leaders’ poor record keeping skills. See supra note 79 and accompanying
text.  Lenders may have foreclosed because they had little way of knowing the financial stability of the
religious organization debtors and effectively decided to cut their losses and move on.
119Interview with M. Fla. Leader Three, supra note 70, at 3; Interview with W. Tenn. Leader One,
supra note 72, at 3; Interview with M. Fla. Leader One, supra note 72, at 2.
120Debtors must file schedules detailing assets, debts, and financial affairs, and monthly reports of net
income.  11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2012).
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reorganization plans, as required by the Code.121
In short, prior to filing, religious organizations’ buildings become an alba-
tross for some debtors and lenders.  Overly emotional attachment of leaders
and congregants to their “spiritual homes” may have impeded progress in re-
structuring their mortgages, while lenders also may have heeded their own
interests that likewise stalled negotiations.  Post-filing, lenders’ apparent de-
sire not to foreclose on churches may have opened the door for successful
negotiations during the chapter 11 proceedings.  Leaders’ ultimate goal of pre-
serving their congregations similarly may have led to productive outcomes as
leaders came to realize what was achievable.
C. LICENSES AND PERMITS; CASH COLLATERAL DISPUTES
Although saving the building was the primary goal of reorganization, at-
torneys identified two other significant hurdles that threatened the reorgani-
zation effort.  First, in an attempt to generate revenue to meet expenses, some
organizations undertook side businesses, such as operating daycares and delis.
These side operations required the maintenance of licenses and permits and
timely inspections.  Unfortunately, some leaders were not versed in the intri-
cacies of these requirements or were not sufficiently attentive to the business
aspects of the church to keep up with the requirements.  Lapsed licenses,
revoked permits, and unanticipated problems with local ordinances plagued a
few attorneys.122
Second, more prevalently, religious organizations faced disputes about
cash collateral upon filing.123  Some attorneys were surprised when lenders
asserted that monies coming into the church from congregants’ donations
were part of their collateral and that the lenders had a right to influence how
the funds were spent on a monthly basis.124  Approaching the issue from a
religious perspective, one attorney thought it “offensive” and “crass” that the
121Monthly reporting may function as a budgeting tool. See Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two,
supra note 70, at 7 (referencing the reporting requirements and noting that keeping records is “extremely
important”); Interview with M. Fla. Leader Two, supra note 70, at 4 (discussing how the chapter 11
process allowed the church to make budget adjustments).  To be confirmed, bankruptcy courts must find
proposed plans feasible, among other requirements. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a); see also Interview with C. Cal.
Leader One, supra note 71, at 6 (describing how the confirmed plan helped the church “stay on top of the
finances as it relates to chapter 11”).
122See Interview with S. Fla. Attorney Three, supra note 41, at 4 (noting that questions arose as to a
deli license); Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Four, at 2 (Apr. 18, 2013) (discussing how some religious
organizations donate or sell food and noting that “they might not be aware about these special licenses that
they need”).
123Cash collateral refers to “cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit ac-
counts, or other cash equivalents” that are property of the estate and subject to a security interest. 11
U.S.C. § 363(a) (2012).  The debtor-in-possession or trustee must obtain permission from the secured
party or an order from the bankruptcy court to use cash collateral in the ordinary course of business during
the chapter 11 case.  11 U.S.C. § 363(c).
124See Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Five, at 2 (May 16, 2013) (noting issues with cash collateral);
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bank claimed a security interest in the “general church revenues” because “the
church is the body of Christ, it’s the people.”125
While not all lenders claimed a lien on the collections and pledges,126 one
attorney counseled that if there is any possibility that lenders might claim a
right to donations and pledges, the debtor should preemptively file a motion
requesting that the court “determine that the tithes and offerings are not cash
collateral.”127  This advice reflected the attorney’s concern that not having
control over cash flow post-petition could severely impact the church’s abil-
ity to reorganize.128  Attorneys’ emphasis on cash flow reflected their greater
concern about creating confirmable plans for organizations whose revenue
came from members’ voluntary donations.
D. ESTABLISHING REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS REGARDING FUTURE
REVENUES
The most serious obstacle that attorneys faced in these cases related to
the need to demonstrate that the debtors would have positive cash flow in
the future.  Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of many of the relig-
ious organizations was that their income defied projection.  Attorneys con-
trasted for-profit business cases, where the debtor could extrapolate future
revenue from past performance, with religious organization cases, where
“[p]ast performance [didn’t] seem to matter in the church if the congregation
want[ed] to survive.”129  Religious organizations in the end are businesses
that principally offer religious services, but “the individuals who take advan-
tage of those services are not obligated to pay anything.”130  Put differently,
“[a] church sells salvation and peace of mind.  And the parishioners contrib-
ute voluntarily for that.”131  And although “that’s functionally equivalent to a
small business selling its product or service,”132 attorneys thought that the
nature of religious organizations’ services made it more difficult to determine
“how much [money] is going to go in the basket each Sunday.”133
Crucially, the concomitant complexity in making projections translated to
Interview with S. Fla. Attorney One, supra note 41, at 3 (noting that the biggest conflict in the case was
over cash collateral).
125Interview with E. N.C. Attorney Two, supra note 91, at 3.
126See Interview with N. Ga. Attorney Three, supra note 48, at 2 (discussing how helpful it is that
“the church’s tithes and offerings . . . are not usually cash collateral”); Interview with S. Tex. Attorney
One, supra note 48, at 3 (noting that the lenders’ attorney did not “push” about cash collateral).
127Interview with N. Ga. Attorney Three, supra note 48, at 2.
128Id.
129Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Six, supra note 79, at 6.
130Interview with M. Fla. Attorney Three, supra note 79, at 2.
131Interview with C. Cal. Attorney One, supra note 43, at 3.
132Id.
133Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Four, supra note 54, at 2; see also Interview with N. Ga. Attorney
Two, supra note 88, at 3 (noting that income projections may not materialize); Interview with N. Ill.
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attorneys worrying about crafting plans that bankruptcy courts, creditors,
and the United States Trustee would find credible.134  Their concerns
seemed to derive from two primary considerations.  The first relates to relig-
ious organizations’ “customers.”  Congregants did not necessarily behave like
typical consumers.  “Everything [was] dependent on the congregation.”135  If
a “critical mass” of members wanted to see the church survive, money almost
magically flowed into the church.136  For example, in the context of a church
with a larger membership base—that is, one that could achieve a critical mass
of committed members—if the church needed more money, “the congregation
just came up with it.”137  Moreover, if congregants did not have sufficient
liquid funds available, members would do “what they [had] to do in order to
keep their church afloat,” including personally guaranteeing loans.138
On the other hand, if congregants became disillusioned, they tended to
leave the church as a group, resulting in the church perishing swiftly and the
bankruptcy court dismissing the case quickly. 139  This dynamic overall did
not reflect the standard model for projecting revenues.  And this led attor-
neys to note that “how the church is going to pay for things” is “something
that has to get a little more attention, a little more thought.”140
Attorneys also thought that leaders had unrealistic expectations about
what chapter 11 could achieve for their organizations.  Leaders assumed that
upon filing, bankruptcy was “going to solve all of our problems.”141  They
Attorney One, note 42, at 3-4 (noting that “[churches’] revenues are not as predictable” because they are
relying on donations).
134See, e.g., Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney Three, supra note 45, at 2 (contrasting small businesses
with churches, as to which “[y]ou don’t have the ability to make close projections regarding income”);
Interview with N. Ga. Attorney One, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that the bank “wanted to just have a
good understanding that there was going to be a revenue stream to satisfy [the church’s] debt); Interview
with C. Cal. Attorney Five, at 3 (May 7, 2013) (commenting that someone “could throw in one of these
religious things and mess everything up”).
135Interview with E. N.C. Attorney Three, supra note 47, at 2.
136Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Two, supra note 92, at 6; see also Interview with N. Ill. Attorney
Six, supra note 89, at 2 (“[A] lot of [the plan process] was getting support from members of the church
. . . .”).
137Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Six, supra note 79, at 4.
138Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Four, supra note 54, at 4; see also Interview with N. Ga. Attorney
One, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that a bishop personally guaranteed a church’s obligation); Interview with
W. Tenn. Attorney One, supra note 86, at 4 (“[B]anks want people to personally guarantee loans.”).  Very
few religious organizations’ loans initially were guaranteed or co-signed by leaders or congregants. See
Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 760.
139See Interview with Md. Attorney Three, supra note 101, at 4 (noting that the operating reports
every month showed negative disposable income and thus a plan was not feasible); Interview with N. Ill.
Attorney Five, supra note 124, at 3 (“[I]f they don’t have the money coming in, the case isn’t going to last
much to begin with.”).
140See Interview with Md. Attorney Two, supra note 89, at 5.
141Interview with Md. Attorney Three, supra note 101, at 2-3. See also Interview with C. Cal.
Attorney Three, supra note 47, at 5 (“Whether it’s a nonprofit or a consumer, you’re still dealing with
people. And people have funny ideas about stuff.”).
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believed “God will provide a donor if they need the money,”142 had unrealis-
tic ideas about how they would cut expenses,143 and “[didn’t] like to think of
[the churches] as businesses.”144  Attorneys sometimes “[did] not get the
level of cooperation that [they thought they] should, which caused “delays”
and “problems.”145  This further contributed to the difficulty in putting forth
a realistic proposal for restructuring the mortgage.
E. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION
Though many chapter 11 debtors may pay their bankruptcy attorneys
reluctantly, some religious organization clients seemed to believe they had a
religious right to a break on fees.  Some leaders asked for a reduction in attor-
neys’ fees, claiming that attorneys were “doing it for the better good of the
community”146 or should “have mercy” on the congregation.147  Attorneys
likewise had taken on the representations with the assumption that there
was a “little bit higher risk of not being paid in full” as compared to small
business clients.148  In fact, attorneys were willing to cut religious organiza-
tions breaks: 63% of the attorneys reduced their hourly rate, lowered their
retainer, were “more generous” with time, or otherwise adapted their fees.149
Some attorneys explicitly mentioned that the religious nature of the organiza-
tion motivated them to tailor their fees.150  In contrast, a few attorneys did
not believe the nature of the client’s business should influence the fees they
charged.151
142Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Five, supra note 124, at 4.
143See Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Four, supra note 54, at 4 (“[P]reacher says, I can do this, I can
increase the tithes, and I can increase the offerings, and I can cut ten percent of money and staff, cut my
salary, so forth.”); Interview with M. Fla. Attorney One, supra note 82, at 2 (“You just have to make sure
they are being realistic . . . .”).
144Interview with N. Ill. Attorney One, supra note 42, at 2; see also Interview with N. Tex. Attorney
Three, supra note 68, at 2 (“[Church leaders] don’t really understand the financial part of the business.”);
Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Two, supra note 111, at 4 (“[Leaders] don’t think like a business.”).
145Interview with Md. Attorney One, supra note 48, at 3. See also Interview with C. Cal. Attorney
Five, supra note 134, at 3 (commenting that religious organization leaders sometimes “want to play
attorney”).
146Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Five, supra note 124, at 2.
147Interview with Md. Attorney Three, supra note 101, at 2; see also Interview with C. Cal. Attor-
ney Six, supra note 79, at 2 (noting that clients “tried to box me in from the beginning” regarding fees).
148Interview with E. N.C. Attorney One, supra note 45, at 2; see also Interview with S. Fla. Attorney
Three, supra note 41, at 2 (“Did I know I was going to eat something at the end?  Yes.”).
149Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Two, supra note 92, at 2.
150See Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Four, supra note 54, at 2 (“I try to give the churches a dis-
count.”); Interview with Md. Attorney Two, supra note 89, at 2 (“I did discount my fee just because of
the nature of the organization.”); Interview with W. Tenn. Attorney One, supra note 86, at 1 (“I did adapt
them because of the nature of the situation.”).
151See Interview with N. Ill. Attorney One, supra note 42, at 2 (noting that there is a misconception
that nonprofits should pay less); Interview with S. Fla. Attorney Two, supra note 97, at 2 (“I treat it like
an entity like any other entity, be it a church or a charitable organization or foundation.”); Interview with
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The uniqueness of religious organization chapter 11 cases and the in-
creased risk of nonpayment of fees theoretically could cause attorneys to hesi-
tate to take on future representations of religious organization debtors.  But
even those attorneys who adapted their fees and who acknowledged that
these cases were “complex” 152 and required “extra effort” 153 said that they
would represent another religious organization if approached.154  Indeed, a
subset of the attorneys interviewed found the work particularly “re-
warding”155 and “more fulfilling” as compared to their other debtor work.156
Representing religious organization debtors gave these attorneys a greater
sense of helping their communities.157  In some instances, it provided them
with the chance to integrate their professional lives with their own faith.158
Moreover, regardless of the attorneys’ individual views, their combined ex-
periences show that even in the face of the hurdles detailed above, the chap-
ter 11 process assisted religious organizations in retaining their buildings and
maintaining their communities, in turn potentially affording creditors greater
recoveries.
IV. SUCCESS THROUGH THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS
“Success” in chapter 11 is relative and often difficult to define.  Scholars
traditionally have measured success based on the percentage of cases in which
a plan is confirmed.159  In the context of religious organizations’ chapter 11
cases, considering debtors’ primary goal of preserving their communities and
C. Cal. Attorney One, supra note 43, at 3 (explaining that there was nothing different between a church
and a small business that needed to reorganize).
152Interview with N. Ga. Attorney Two, supra note 88, at 1; see also Interview with W. Tenn.
Attorney One, supra note 86, at 4 (characterizing the cases as “challenging”); Interview with S. Fla.
Attorney One, supra note 41, at 5 (same).
153Interview with N. Tex. Attorney One, at 4 (May 1, 2013).
154Thirty out of thirty-two attorneys who were continuing their chapter 11 practices said they would
represent a religious organization again.  One other attorney was retiring and two other attorneys were
focusing on consumer cases going forward.  Attorneys who indicated that they may hesitate to take on
another religious institution’s reorganization case alluded to the internal dynamics and lack of revenue
unless the congregation backed the church, the probability of which seemed random, as prompting their
reluctance.
155Interview with S. Fla. Attorney One, supra note 41, at 5.
156Interview with C. Cal. Attorney Four, supra note 122, at 5.
157See Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Four, supra note 54, at 6 (“Many churches that come to me are
people that have nowhere else to go.”); Interview with N. Tex. Attorney One, supra note 153, at 4 (“I
really want to make it work because these people contribute to the community and they’re good people.”).
158See Interview with E. N.C. Attorney Two, supra note 91, at 6 (describing the representation in
terms of “ministry”); Interview with S. Tex. Attorney Two, supra note 44, at 7 (noting the benefit of
being able to speak “the language of religion”).
159See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 752; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full
Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 1), 57 AM. BANKR. L. J. 99, 106
(1983) (“From the viewpoint of the courts or policy makers, confirmation and consummation of a plan are
probably both necessary elements of success.”).
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secondary goal of saving their buildings (which may be necessary to achieve
their primary goal),160 success may be broadened to include outcomes
whereby congregations continued operating post-bankruptcy.  Such outcomes
would include a settlement between the debtor and its creditors during the
case, a settlement achieved out-of-court after the case was dismissed, or a sale
of assets that yielded sufficient funds for the congregation to continue operat-
ing, albeit possibly in a different location.  From this broader perspective of
success, the chapter 11 process seemed highly successful in achieving these
goals for religious organizations.
Solely from reviewing court records, 34% of the religious organization
cases studied ended productively.161  The court confirmed a plan in 25% of
the cases, and in 9% of the cases, the debtor and its creditors negotiated a
settlement during the pendency of the case that allowed the organization to
continue operating post-bankruptcy.162  In the context of chapter 11 gener-
ally, this percentage reflects a success rate on par with or greater than previ-
ous reports of success in cases filed by for-profit businesses.163
Bankruptcy court records reflect that judges dismissed the other cases for
various reasons, including because the debtor failed to file documents timely,
secured creditors or the UST argued that the reorganization was not feasible,
or the debtor filed a motion to dismiss that contained little or no explanation
of why it sought dismissal. 164  The filing data also show that the court dis-
missed these cases relatively quickly,165 thereby reducing administrative ex-
penses, possible general loss of value, and the time during which creditors
160See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 767-68 (noting that the survival of a congrega-
tion often seemed tied to saving the church building).
161Id. at 756 tbl.6.
162Id.  If confirmed liquidation plans are added to the calculation, 35% of cases ended productively. Id.
163See, e.g., Anne Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage: Diagnosing a Debtor’s Prospects for Success, 54 ARIZ. L.
REV. 985, 1004 (2012) (reporting a 34% confirmation rate in a sample of chapter 11 cases filed in 2004);
Warren & Westbrook, supra note 8, at 615 (reporting a 30.3% confirmation rate in a sample of chapter 11
cases filed in 1994 and a 33.4% confirmation rate in a sample of chapter 11 cases filed in 2004); Douglas G.
Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
2310, 2324 (2005) (studying small businesses that filed under chapter 11 in the Northern District of
Illinois during 1998 and reporting a 22% confirmation rate, plus an additional 8% of cases that ended in a
consensual agreement between the debtor and creditors, for a combined success rate of 30%); Edward M.
Flynn, Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11, Administrative Office of the United States Courts 10-11 (Oct.
1989) (unpublished report) (reporting a 17% confirmation rate for chapter 11 cases filed between 1979 to
1986).
164Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 745-49.
165For example, the median time frame in which bankruptcy courts disposed of cases was seven and
one-half months and, in cases in which no plan had been proposed, the median was four and one-half
months. Id. at 747 tb1 4.  A prior study of chapter 11 characterized the median time of seven months as
“remarkably quick.”  Warren & Westbrook, supra note 8, at 631-32; see also Foohey, Bankrupting the
Faith, supra note 2, at 745-46 (discussing reasonable benchmarks of how long it takes to sell a business
privately or reorganize under previous bankruptcy laws).
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were unable to collect on their debts. 166
But one can glean only so much information from court records in terms
of analyzing the successes of chapter 11.  The interviews with attorneys indi-
cate that many more cases ended productively than is evident from examining
the filing data, and that a sizable majority of the religious organizations sur-
vived post-bankruptcy, even if they had to relocate the congregation.  Table
3 summarizes the outcome of the fifty two religious organization chapter 11
cases that attorneys discussed in detail during the interviews.167
Table 3: Outcomes of Religious Organization Cases
Handled by Interviewed Attorneys
N %
Reorganization Plan Confirmed 12 23.1
Agreement with Creditors 18 34.6
Dismissed; Resolved Issues Later 3 5.8
Dismissed; Closed or Unresolved 19 36.5
Total 52 100.0
In 23% of these fifty two cases, the court confirmed a reorganization plan.
This percentage aligns with the reorganization plan confirmation rate among
all religious organization debtors that filed during the study timeframe.168
But in another 35% of the cases, the debtor and its creditors came to an
agreement during the pendency of the proceedings, a percentage that is al-
most four times greater than what I was able to verify through a conservative
review of court records.  Fifteen (83%) of the eighteen court-approved agree-
ments involved a refinancing or similar form of settlement with the mortgage
lender.169  This suggests that relying on court records alone fails to capture a
significant portion of bankruptcy cases that end constructively.170
Additionally, in three cases that the court dismissed without an agree-
166See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 2, at 743.
167The attorneys I interviewed handled a total of seventy cases.  Because of time limitations, I only
could discuss with each attorney at most three cases during a given interview because I wanted to discuss
each case in-depth.  As some attorneys represented as many as five religious organizations during the study
timeframe, I asked these attorneys to focus on at most three cases.
168This suggests that the attorneys I interviewed had handled cases that constituted a representative
sample of religious organization debtors generally.
169In the other three cases, the debtor entered into a payment agreement with the Internal Revenue
Service, a financing agreement with a new lender, and an agreement with its secured creditor whereby it
sold its property and then used the proceeds to move to a new location.
170Though attorneys may have a tendency to exaggerate the productiveness of cases, the 35% figure is
based on whether the debtor and its creditors entered into a consensual agreement that resolved the case.
Another possible source of corroboration would be a future review of the registries of deeds in order to
determine what percentage of debtors still owned their buildings post-bankruptcy.
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ment in place, the debtor subsequently resolved its financial issues and was
able to stay indefinitely in its pre-filing location.171  Adding these cases yields
a 64% success rate.  Of course, it is unknown whether the debtors could have
attained the same outcomes through negotiated arrangements outside of
bankruptcy, particularly if the attorneys are correct in their supposition that
lenders ultimately do not want to foreclose on a church building.  Nonethe-
less, the interviewed leaders indicated that they tried to work with their
creditors before turning to bankruptcy.172  The chapter 11 process, thus, may
have greatly facilitated the negotiations.173
At the time of the interviews in spring 2013, the attorneys indicated that
thirty seven (71%) of the fifty two religious organizations remained operat-
ing,174 although at least seven had moved locations and two were in the
midst of foreclosure.175  This percentage is higher than the 64% success rate
because several of the churches moved locations after the court dismissed
their cases, effectively restarting.  Significantly, these results contradict the
results of a prior study of small businesses’ chapter 11 filings in the Northern
District of Illinois during 1998, which found that nearly 60% of the busi-
nesses closed post-bankruptcy.176
Nonetheless, although a majority of debtors were operating months or
years after their cases ended, their continued operation did not necessarily
mean that they would be able to meet the specifics of their plans and agree-
ments over the long term.177  Interviewed leaders seemed concerned about
their churches’ survival, explaining that staying current with expenses re-
mained a struggle: “we are able to pay as we go and keep our nose clean.”178
171In one case, a parent association stepped in to save the debtor, who ran a Christian school; and in
the two other cases, the mortgage lender and the debtor came to an agreement post-dismissal.
172See, e.g., Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 70, at 4 (stating that the church tried to
negotiate with the mortgage lender, among other non-legal actions); Interview with N. Ill. Leader One,
supra note 73, at 2-3 (noting that the leadership thought their mortgage creditor would modify their loan);
Interview with M. Fla. Leader Two, supra note 70, at 1 (detailing how the leadership was unsuccessful in
renegotiating the mortgage loan); Interview with C. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 70, at 2  (“We went to
the bank several times and tried to get a modification or work some terms out.”).
173The fact that some lenders told religious organizations’ leaders to consider bankruptcy further sug-
gests that negotiated agreements may not have been possible in some instances. See supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
174As to six debtors, the attorneys had lost contact with their clients such that they did not know
whether the organization was operating as of the time of the interview.
175Not all of the attorneys discussed exactly where their clients were operating as of the time of the
interviews.
176Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in
Small-Business Bankruptcies, 50 J. L. & ECON. 381, 382 (2007).
177See Baird & Morrison, supra note 163, at 2324-25 (finding that 44% of the studied small business
debtors that confirmed reorganization plans defaulted on their plans with about two and a half years of
confirmation).
178Interview with M. Fla. Leader Two, supra note 70, at 4-5; see also Interview with C. Cal. Leader
Two, supra note 70, at 2 (explaining that the church planned to sell its building with the hope of retaining
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Reorganization may have prevented or at least delayed foreclosure, but the
churches still needed to resolve the underlying operational problems that had
landed them in bankruptcy.
Yet most of the leaders considered their bankruptcy cases productive be-
cause they helped the churches begin to address these underlying issues,179
which may bode well for the churches’ continued operations.  For instance,
one leader thought that the congregation was stronger post-bankruptcy.  The
members “stood firm as a church,” which “increase[d] their faith and in-
crease[d] their tithing as well.”180  Even if they foresaw relinquishing their
buildings in the future, leaders claimed that their cases “gave them more time”
to be in their physical spaces, and in turn gave them more time to convince
the most committed members to understand that moving the congregation to
a new smaller location may be for the best.181  Attorneys similarly noted that
the church filings “focuse[d] everybody’s attention on what need[ed] to be
done.”182  Some attorneys added that, even in those cases that resulted in the
church dissolving, the process helped leaders and members realize sooner that
their ministries were not viable, which in turn aided them in making the
necessary shut-down transitions.183
These continued successes suggest that for those religious institutions not
part of larger organizations to which they could turn for financial assistance,
or that had reached an impasse in negotiations with their creditors, filing
under chapter 11 offered a potentially worthwhile option.  Importantly, the
longer-term results provide evidence that at least one set of what ultimately
are small businesses are using chapter 11 in a way that appears to be produc-
tive for debtors and their creditors. 184  In contrast to prior assertions that
some money to use to “relocate to something more affordable”); Interview with M. Fla. Leader One, supra
note 72, at 4 (discussing how the case only is “going to be successful if we come out on the other end of
the mortgage”); Interview with N. Ill. Attorney Three, supra note 79, at 5 (noting that post-reorganiza-
tion, religious organizations are “struggling; they’re all in a struggle capacity”).
179Seven of the ten leaders stated that they thought their church’s case was successful.
180Interview with M. Fla. Leader Three, supra note 70, at 6.
181Interview with C. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 70, at 8; see also Interview with W. Tenn. Leader
One, supra note 72, at 4 (noting that the building was “personal,” but that they ultimately “decided to
turn it back over to the bank”).
182Interview with C. Cal. Attorney One, supra note 43, at 3.
183See, e.g., Interview with Md. Attorney Three, supra note 101, at 4-5 (noting that operating reports
showed negative income every month, which led the attorney to discuss the church’s survival prospects);
Interview with E. N.C. Attorney One, supra note 45, at 4 (“[W]e bought them . . . time in which to try to
make things happen”); Interview with N. Ill. Attorney One, supra note 42, at 4 (“If you solve the
problems, and if you make transitions, then you have used the chapter 11 process well.”).  Seen from this
broader perspective, almost all of the debtors may have benefited from the chapter 11 process.  Depending
on what could have been achieved without resorting to bankruptcy, most creditors on balance also may
have benefitted from being forced to participate in the chapter 11 process.
184See supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting that third-quarters of the studied religious organi-
zations qualified as small business debtors).
304 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 88
the chapter 11 process wastes resources and usually is unproductive, 185 the
religious organizations’ chapter 11 cases studied predominately can be catego-
rized as successful.  Other subsets of small businesses likewise may find chap-
ter 11 beneficial to themselves and their creditors—a question that bears
additional study, particular in light of BAPCPA’s amendments directed to-
ward small business debtors.186
CONCLUSION
This Article sought to expand on my prior conclusion based on case fil-
ings that chapter 11 had the potential to offer religious organizations an effec-
tive solution to their financial distress.  The results of my interviews with
religious organizations’ leaders and their bankruptcy attorneys substantiate
this conclusion.  They also reveal a success rate considerably higher than evi-
dent from examining court records alone, and considerably higher than previ-
ously reported success rates in chapter 11 cases filed by small businesses, a
result that is important to ongoing debates about small businesses’ use of
bankruptcy.
Going forward, attorneys may call upon the findings detailed above to
establish realistic benchmarks of what their religious organization clients can
hope to achieve in chapter 11.  This may reduce unproductive friction during
the cases, and result in more constructive (and possibly swifter) negotiations
and allow leaders with unsustainable congregations to realize that they may
need to move on sooner, potentially increasing the success rate in the fu-
ture.187  Attorneys also may leverage the findings to convince lenders and
other creditors to negotiate outside bankruptcy, thereby saving the costs of
chapter 11.  If a creditor’s tactics drive a religious organization to file under
chapter 11, there is a substantial chance that the case will end with a con-
firmed plan or other agreement that allows the organization to continue oper-
ating.  In short, as one attorney remarked, “there’s a space to help [religious
organizations] with the [chapter 11] process so they can either maintain the
185See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 8, at 604-05 (“[Critics] claim that the current Chapter 11
system suffers from high failure rates and endless delays that prevent the system from yielding much
value.”); Morrison, supra note 176, at 381-82 (noting that critics argue that “Chapter 11 prevents or
retards the reallocation of assets.”).
186See James B. Haines Jr. & Philip J. Hendel, No Easy Answers: Small Business Bankruptcy After
BAPCPA, 47 B.C. L. REV. 71 (2005) (overviewing the small business provisions that BAPCPA added to
the Code).  This Article is the first to report longer-term outcomes of chapter 11 cases filed by small
businesses post-BAPCPA.
187Generally, shorter cases reduce the costs of reorganization to both debtors and creditors. In a relig-
ious reorganization case, however, it could be argued that there is value to be realized from remaining in
chapter 11 longer.  The chapter 11 process forces the debtor to be subject to greater financial accountabil-
ity and controls, giving these leaders more practice at managing their organizations’ budgets, which may in
turn increase the probability that the churches will be able to meet their obligations in the future.
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asset or sell the asset to the benefit of the church.”188
Finally, the results of the interviews call attention to another aspect of
these chapter 11 cases that was not obvious from an examination of court
records.  Black Churches seem to turn to chapter 11 in the face of financial
distress more often than churches with other membership demographics.
The racial demographic skew among religious organization debtors presents
two main avenues for future study: why Black Churches turn to bankruptcy,
and the role of secured lenders in funding this subset of churches.
188Interview with Md. Attorney Two, supra note 89, at 5.
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